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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD *Cominex*  
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD *2.7*

VIA: United States Intelligence Board Security Committee *2.6/v*

SUBJECT: Report on Downgrading and Sanitization

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, in response to the instruction of the United States Intelligence Board,\* has made an intensive study of existing procedures for the use of TALENT- and KEYHOLE-derived material outside of the TALENT System and an evaluation of the effect of such action on the security of the U-2 and satellite photography. This review was conducted in the first instance by a special working group established by COMOR which received very complete briefings on all aspects of downgrading and sanitization and retains in its file much additional detail as background for its report, which report is transmitted herewith as Tab A. COMOR has reviewed this report and presents its recommendations in paragraph 8 below.

2. In order to discharge its responsibilities more effectively in the field of sanitization and decontrol and to insure adequate staff work in preparing recommendations for the Board in these matters, COMOR has established a permanent working group on sanitization and decontrol.

3. The Working Group, while endeavoring to identify all security loopholes, was also guided by the need to make TALENT- and KEYHOLE-derived material available to the maximum extent compatible with the need to protect the means of collection, as defined below in paragraph 5. TALENT- and KEYHOLE-derived material is needed:

\*See USIB-D-41.12/9; COMOR-D-7/19 (IBSEC-PR/4)  
 Also see COMOR-D-7/13

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a. To meet specific needs of military planners for maps, charts, and targeting materials; and


b. In response to a variety of requirements directly serving highest priority national intelligence objectives, many of which are ad hoc in nature.

COMOR endorses the Working Group opinion that its review of the needs against which sanitized information is currently being produced reveals that information from the TALENT Control System and its KEYHOLE compartment must be made available outside of the System.

4. In considering the definitions proposed in IBSEC-PR/4, the Working Group accepted the definitions for decontrol, downgrading, and declassification, and the definition of sanitization insofar as it reads, "Sanitization is the effective concealment in classified material of intelligence sources and methods." However, the proposed further qualification of "sanitization" in terms that denote absolute concealment of photographic source is considered unrealistic when viewed from the standpoint of collection system capabilities and purpose, the very nature of the product collected, the vast amount of information already released, and the true restraints of conventional security classification. In such instances, however, adequate controls of the material are required to ensure dissemination and use only for those purposes originally authorized.

5. COMOR notes that the Working Group approached its task on the initial premise that its problem was to consider the need for further protection of the TALENT and KEYHOLE products within the U. S. Government. Basically, therefore, it regarded as a reasonable objective concealment of definitive information as to the qualitative and quantitative capability of overhead collection systems and demonstrable proof of the source. The fact that the sanitized product would be classified and controlled SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM and CONTROLLED DISSEM

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


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appeared to the Working Group as potentially offering adequate protection if two important interrelated requirements were met. First, that the controlled dissemination be a means of ensuring that only essential legitimate users received the product. Second, that any further use be controlled by appropriately cleared senior officials with a thorough appreciation of the need to protect the source within the limits specified above. The Working Group identifies the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of each agency and department as the logical point of control.

6. The Working Group notes that problems discussed at USIB in November 1963 (USIB-D-41.17/22; COMOR-D-46/13) concerning

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
7. In the investigation of media used for sanitization and disseminating the T-KH derived information, the procedures used by the community were found to be fundamentally sound. Although each issuance carries a calculable risk, effective concealment is generally being achieved through the control of the form, scope and extent of detail in each release, and the frequency and extent of dissemination. COMOR recognizes the areas of principal concern to be:

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a. Need for a more uniform interpretation of sanitization procedures among the various producers of similar types of publications and cartographic materials.

b. Need to eliminate the abuse of sanitized information by extracting information from authorized publications and reconstituting it in forms which defeat the effective concealment provided by the original release. A similar danger exists in the retrieval of information from automated data bases.

c. Need for critical review of dissemination lists. Many issuances appear to receive too wide dissemination when viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably strict need-to-know application.

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8. In order to discharge its responsibilities more effectively in the field of sanitization and decontrol and to ensure adequate staff work in preparing recommendations in regard to these matters, COMOR has established a permanent working group on decontrol and sanitization.

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TAB A

Report of the Downgrading & Sanitization Working Group  
of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Introduction

1. The CDG&S Working Group has completed its investigation of the security aspects of "sanitization" and "downgrading" as suggested in IBSEC-PR/4. The detailed instructions of its COMOR charge, as contained in COMOR-D-7/13, have also been met and explored. The majority of the answers were given the Working Group in the form of briefings, and the information developed is either in minutes or in memoranda circulated to the Working Group and on file in the Secretariat. This report is devoted primarily to condensed summaries of the problem areas with each report followed by recommendations. The reports are prefaced by extracts from IBSEC-PR/4 and COMOR-D-7/13 and brief comments as to how the Working Group interpreted these two papers for guidance.

2. Attachment 1 to this paper is addressed specifically to the question of "Guidance for Revision of Sanitization and Decontrol Manual." This paper goes into the details of sanitization, decontrol, downgrading, and declassification; interprets the terms, sanitization and decontrol, in terms applicable to COMOR; and outlines how in the estimation of the Working Group the Manual and its annexes should be revised in accordance with this paper.

3. The Working Group will submit a separate paper on the question of release of information [redacted] There are two main reasons for the delay. First of all the Working Group learned that charts and other targeting materials had been released [redacted] to the TDI information. The extent of the releases and the effect of this have not yet been fully determined. Furthermore, with regard to the release of additional information [redacted] the Working Group observes that the request as originally forwarded in COMOR-D-7/18

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has probably been changed and perhaps augmented since the recent

this question of changes was discussed in detail.

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Comments on IBSEC-PR/4 and COMOR-D-7/13

4. The introduction to IBSEC-PR/4 noted that

"The USIB expressed its concern as to the effectiveness of sanitization and downgrading procedures and directed that the Security Committee should review the procedures within the intelligence community for the control of sanitization and downgrading of sensitive intelligence."

In extension of the reasons for its concern, it added that

"In many instances, such systems produce the only intelligence concerning large areas of the Soviet and satellite countries which are highly controlled and inaccessible for intelligence exploitation."

Next it reminded COMOR of Presidential concern for the protection of exotic and expensive collection devices stating that

"This extreme concern is reflected in Presidential Directives which set forth stringent requirements to ensure the protection of such sources and methods."

However, this charge is ameliorated by the statement that a second vital consideration is

"Optimum intelligence exploitation of the information collected."

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COMOR-D-7/1 expresses this in terms of encouraging and facilitating

" . . . the maximum use of TALENT Control materials and information outside of the TALENT Control System consistent with the preservation of source security and the highest national interest of the United States."

The Working Group has been guided by the need to balance both considerations.

5. With reference to the interpretation of sanitization, IBSEC-PR/4 made the general statement about sanitization that

" . . . it is a well recognized and accepted basic premise that sanitization connotes effective concealment of the method and source of collection and that the dissemination and use of sanitized material is determined by need to know and classification."

It also states that

"Highly technical factors make it difficult to devise effective and plausible cover stories that can be carried forward with the sanitized materials."

"The concealment of sources and methods was not entirely ensured in every instance; however, any security hazards present were calculable since T and KH contributions were limited and the use of targeting publications containing such information was controlled and restricted to urgent targeting requirements. Over recent years, however, the dissemination and use of

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targeting and mapping publications utilizing T and KH information has broadened greatly."

"There is serious concern expressed that the current procedures for sanitization do not conceal the sources and methods involved and that the current program of sanitization for the use of T and KH information jeopardizes the sources and methods involved."

The consensus of the Working Group, based on its investigation and a realistic appraisal of problems, was that with the exception of concern with dissemination, the foregoing mainly involve mechanical problems or reflect concern with absolute protection of the source rather than a workable denial to the opposition of definitive information as to the qualitative and quantitative capability of satellite collection systems. The Working Group concerned itself primarily with means for denying the latter rather than absolute protection. In its consideration, the Working Group was also mindful of the fact that the fundamental problem was to consider the need for further protection of the TALENT and KEYHOLE products within the United States Government. Basically, therefore, it regarded as a reasonable objection the concealment of definitive information as to the qualitative and quantitative capability of overhead collection systems and demonstrable proof of the source. The fact that the sanitized product would be classified and controlled SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM and CONTROLLED DISSEM appeared to the Working Group as potentially offering adequate protection if two important interrelated requirements were met. First, that the controlled dissemination be a means of ensuring that only essential legitimate users received the product. Second, that any further use be controlled by appropriately cleared senior officials with a thorough appreciation of the need to protect the source within the limits specified above. The Working Group identifies the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of each agency and department as the logical point of control.

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6. With regard to problems raised by making T-KH derived material available to foreign governments, the Working Group noted that this problem breaks down into three categories:

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Although USIB has already approved certain releases through [redacted] mechanism, it has also directed the Working Group, through COMOR, to re-examine [redacted] A report is being prepared. USIB

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[redacted]  
rule that release to other foreigners must be approved by USIB.

7. Finally, the Working Group addressed itself especially to problems of the control of dissemination. It based this approach on the IBSEC-PR/4 statement that

"Procedures for the sanitization of T and KH are specific and relate to definite uses such as targeting publications, maps, charts, and photomosaic maps. The Security Committee is aware that COMOR initially instituted sanitization procedures for the use of T and KH information in targeting publications in order to meet urgent targeting requirements vital to the national defense."

This statement suggests a recognition of the need for maximum utilization of KH information at the SECRET level for specific, primarily military,

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
purposes. The Working Group felt, however, that this should not exclude sanitization for purposes of intelligence collection guidance as well as other needs of intelligence analysts when the needs are great enough to justify the risk involved. It was specific, however, on application of the need-to-know principle which should, if properly applied, exclude misuse of information because of its ready accessibility to persons with the necessary clearances but without an established need to know.

8. A fundamental principle guiding the Working Group is that, although there has been little or no jeopardy arising from either carelessness in interpretation or application of sanitization procedures or because of anything basically wrong with COMOR-D-7/1 itself, this does not mean that improvements are impossible. The fact that there have not been abuses suggests that basically the concept of the Manual was sound, and if sanitization is accomplished for the purposes intended, jeopardy to security is minimal. Security problems arise principally in connection with the dissemination and subsequent uses or abuses of the targeting materials, maps, etc. The next sections address themselves to the problem areas.

Maps and Charts

9. It was found that interpretation of sanitization policies varies considerably among the several producers. However, even in instances where the interpretation has been most liberal, actions taken have been to meet real demands of "need-to-know" consumers. Maps and charts at the scales  by their very nature and the production time and processes involve present security considerations substantially less critical than either the quick reaction or compendium type issuances. Community production capability together with the basic mechanics of maps and chart making generally result in a relatively slow-phased release of these publications, with the result that the real capabilities of the collection system at any given point in time are fairly thoroughly obscured. Intelligence annotations to the basic map or chart have been of some concern to the Working Group. Care must be taken to ensure that source capability is not revealed by dates assigned to individual annotations or by

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precise measurements which could not logically be attributed to some other less sensitive source. In addition, sanitization procedures need further standardization and improvement. With these points resolved, it is considered that security objectives will be adequately met for maps and charts by use of normal security classifications and caveats as necessary against release to foreigners and contractors, and against further reproduction in whole or in part without specific approval by the SIO in consultation with the issuing agency. As in the case of all sanitized products, dissemination should be on a strict need-to-know basis.

Recommendations - On Maps and Charts (Para 9)

A. That all reference to the date, nature, or reliability of specific sources be eliminated.

B. That there must be USIB approval for the publication of each type of map, chart, or other cartographic material with a clear understanding as to the intended use and precisely what information may appear on each series or type.

C. That, in general, larger scale maps, charts, cartographic materials, or such other materials as contain a considerable amount of information on military objectives will require the following annotation in addition to NO FOREIGN DISSEM and CONTROLLED DISSEM as given below. [The Working Group expects that smaller scale maps or charts which are approved for general purpose use will, in addition to the appropriate classification, most probably bear the control markings NO FOREIGN DISSEM--CONTROLLED DISSEM with no caveats appearing on the map or chart regarding additional controls.]


(1) CONTROLLED DISSEM. In addition to controlled dissemination per DCID 1/7, this (map, chart, etc.) is produced for the following purposes:

a.

b.

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
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Recommendations - On Targeting Publications (Paras 10, 11, 12)

A. That all reference to the date, nature, or reliability of specific sources be eliminated.

B. That each publication produced under the terms of Annex C of COMOR-D-7/1 be stamped SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM and CONTROLLED DISSEM (with the type of statement given under a, b, and c below).

C. That there must be USIB approval for each type of product with a clear understanding as to the intended use and precisely what information may appear in each publication.

D. That the authority of the SIO to approve use for other than specified purposes does not include new publications with a wide dissemination, either within an agency or interagency which it is intended to produce periodically.

(1) CONTROLLED DISSEM. In addition to controlled dissemination per DCID 1/7, this document has been produced under the authority of USIB for the following purposes:

a.

b.

c.

(2) The SIO is responsible for ensuring that all those to whom this document is addressed have the necessary need-to-know. He maintains the


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
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list of authorized addressees and he must approve additions to the list.

(3) Republication or use of the information contained in this document either in whole or in part for purposes other than those specified above must be referred to the SIO for approval. The intent of the authority of the SIO is to cover what may be defined as second generation or ad hoc use of material. Publications with broad dissemination or to be produced periodically are regarded as first generation and must receive USIB approval.

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Priority Reconnaissance Objectives List (PROL)



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The rejoinder that continuing changes to these targets argue the existence of an unusually good capability was most frequently countered by the statement that this same information can be procured from the TDI and that this document has a wider dissemination than the PROL.

Recommendations - On PROL (Para 13)

A. That the HPL's list of targets not be permitted to appear in the PROL as a separate section. When included as individual items, they should not be identifiable by symbol, number, or any other form of identification either with COMOR or the Highest Priority List. [Note: The Working Group is of the opinion that all HPL targets are of community interest and will most probably have been submitted for inclusion as of interest to some command or consumer.]

B. That the ADMIN column be excised.

Highest Priority List (HPL)


14. The Highest Priority List (HPL) was of paramount concern to the Working Group because it in effect shows all of the COMOR targets in one publication. It has much more limited dissemination than the PROL. However, serious consideration should be given to publishing this only in the T-KH System.

Recommendations - On HPL (Para 14)

A. That the HPL be published within the T-KH System except as noted below.

B. That, whereas it is permissible to publish a separate list of highest priority targets covering objectives to be overflowed by NRO reconnaissance programs being conducted at the SECRET level and

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
COMOR numbers may be used, they may not be identified as such. Any questions arising from the use of these particular numbers will be answered by explaining that they have been established to facilitate handling of the end product.

Automated Intelligence File (AIF)

15. The Working Group received a briefing on the Production Center, the ADPS, and the Automated Intelligence File (AIF) as produced by the ADPS. The Production Center is an all-source processing center which, although the major contributor of information to ADPS, is not the sole contributor. The information included in the AIF is classified no higher than SECRET. Neither this information nor the AIF product are stamped NOFORN but the handling procedures are such that this is inherent. It was the opinion of the Working Group that the sanitization procedures of the Production Center pose no security problems not common to any other all-source center. The sanitization procedures preliminary to permitting T-KH derived material to be included in the AIF are carefully controlled, and where it is included, it is mixed with a quantity of collateral. Where facts based solely on KH are forwarded to AIF, there is not mass release but rather such information is dribbled out with the same timing stipulation followed for release of this information to the TDI. The carded or taped information in the AIF has no statement of validation. The confidence factor of the users rests on knowledge that material is not sent forward for AIF processing unless it has been validated in accordance with further stringent DIA instruction. Also there are no source attributions.

16. The AIF, as indicated above, receives no material classified higher than SECRET. Also as stated above the Production Center is not the sole input, which means that ADPS can and does receive T-KH based sanitized material, as well as collateral, from other sources, such as the Special Study Panel which produces the

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
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Recommendations - On AIF (Paras 15, 16, 17, and 18)

A. That those recommendations given under (1) be applied to the Commands receiving AIF materials and those under (2) to the Washington community.

(1) That AIF cards and tapes sent to a unit with the ability to process will be accompanied by a memorandum specifying that the material is NO FOREIGN DISSEM-- CONTROLLED DISSEM. It will then contain the following statements:

a. CONTROLLED DISSEM. In addition to controlled dissemination per DCID 1/7, it is specified that this material is sent to you for the following purposes:

(i)


(ii)

(iii)

b. Use of the information either in whole or in part for purposes other than those specified above must be approved by the SIO or a designee with the appropriate clearances.

(2) That to cover requests within Washington, the DIA should institute a procedure requiring a written request whenever the AIF is to be run for a purpose other than for production of one of the publications authorized

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


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under Annex C. This request must be approved within the requesting agency by an officer designated to act on such requests by the SIO of the requesting agency. The final product will be reviewed within DIA to assure that its format and the ultimate use are in accordance with policy established for the release and use of such materials. If the intended use is for publication as described in para 12 and the recommendations following that paragraph, USIB approval would, of course, be required.

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TAB A  
Attachment 1

Guidance for Revision of  
Sanitization and Decontrol Manual

Introduction

1. The Working Group considered the IBSEC definitions of sanitization, decontrol, downgrading, and declassification, as appearing in IBSEC-PR/4 of 26 November 1963, and gives them below:

Sanitization: Sanitization is the effective concealment in classified material of intelligence sources and methods. A prerequisite for sanitization is the existence or reasonable presumption of the existence of a separate and logical, less sensitive, source. Information may not be reported in the sanitization with a precision or exactness that exceeds the capability of the less sensitive source.

Decontrol: The removal of material from a system of compartmentation for sensitive intelligence.

Downgrading: The change of existing classification to a lower level of classification.

Declassification: The complete removal of classification. (This includes removal from a system of control.)

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2. In considering the above definitions, the Working Group noted that basically there are three different conditions under which there is need to use TALENT- and KEYHOLE-derived material at lower classification and without System controls. These are:

a. Release of an information report based on material derived from overhead reconnaissance with maximum effort to conceal the true nature of the source.

b. Use of the products of overhead reconnaissance but out of the System with reasonable precautions being taken to conceal the true capabilities of the source.

c. Peculiar to TALENT at this time is the need to break out information and some photography from a mission with adequate protection of operational aspects. This action would require concealment of the base of operations, the exact tracks, and perhaps other operational information.

#### Sanitization and Decontrol

3. In attempting to use the definitions of IBSEC and rationalize these with the conditions described above, the Working Group felt that its actions could best be described under two major headings, sanitization and decontrol.

4. While conceding that the IBSEC definition of sanitization applies most correctly to the type of action described under 2a above,



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it also feels that the processes followed to use KH- derived material in the production of SECRET maps and targeting documents, 2b, must be described under sanitization rather than decontrol. In the case of the latter which have been and will be covered under Annexes B and C of any sanitization and decontrol manual, it was recognized that in lieu of the existence of the prerequisite or reasonable presumption of the existence of a logical source, there would only be a general cover story which would act as a baffle against inquiries as to the specific source of any piece of information. If there should be a reason to release a specific report as the result of an inquiry as to source, the type of sanitization procedure followed under Annex A would be used.

5. The Working Group was unanimous in agreeing that, for the type of situation described in 2c above and to cover the actions which will come under the new Annexes D, E, F, and G, decontrol is what is involved, that is, removal from a control system.

6. The Working Group notes that downgrading is also employed because, while information is TOP SECRET while in the System, it becomes SECRET or goes to a lower classification at the time that it is sanitized or decontrolled. Therefore, the term downgrading may be employed in conjunction with either sanitization or decontrol, but there is no need to write an annex to a manual to cover the use of this term.

#### General Comments on Revision of Manual

7. The Working Group agrees that a new manual and new annexes are needed and that it is of the essence for any new manual not only to define the meaning of sanitization, decontrol, and downgrading but to delineate basic policies and be precise in its instructions. It should be made clear to all responsible in any way for the release of

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information from a system under COMOR cognizance that such release must be to meet clearly defined needs and that procedures for continuing control on a need-to-know basis are essential. In its consideration of the Manual the Working Group concentrated on the needs of and use by U. S. Government officials and planners. Contractors and Foreign Governments present different problems, requiring referral to USIB.

8. The Working Group considers it fundamental for the Manual and each annex (an outline of these is given in paragraph 10) to be clear on:

a. The purpose of each sanitization or decontrol process relating it to the actual need for producing information at a particular level of classification in a particular form. This will include identification of production items and the intended approved use.

b. The need for maximum protection of the system from which the material is released. This in every instance should specify the exact extent to which the sanitization or decontrol process must either achieve near complete protection of the source (Annex A), protect various aspects of the capability (Annexes B and C), or protect operational information (Annexes D, E, F, and G).

c. The responsibility of producers and Senior Intelligence Officers.

9. To carry out his responsibility, the producer will require scrutiny of his internal instructions by some central authority designated

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
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for this purpose by COMOR. Such authority will ensure that interpretation of the basic annex to the Manual is adequate. Such authority would also render such assistance as might be needed on the format of the product. The Working Group concludes that it should be the responsibility of the Senior Intelligence Officer to control dissemination and use of all T- and KH-derived material produced within the sphere of his responsibility. His prime objective will be to avoid violations resulting from misuses while at the same time ensuring maximum use for approved purposes.

#### Outline of Annexes

10. The following is an outline of action to be covered in each of the annexes:



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and use in accordance with specific authority. Additional dissemination or use of the product for purposes other than those specified in Annex B will be controlled by the Senior Intelligence Officer of each agency. Disclosure to Foreign Governments or contractors other than those specified can only be authorized by USIB.

c. Sanitization per Annex C: This annex defines the specific steps to be taken in order that material may be sanitized and used in targeting publications. The same principals and stipulations regarding dissemination and use as appear under "Sanitization per Annex B" will apply to Annex C. This includes need for referral to USIB if Foreign Governments or contractors become involved.

d. Decontrol per Annex D: This procedure will cover the decontrol and release of material in a situation of minimum operational sensitivity. Recommendations for such release will most probably be based either on the fact that the material was obtained a number of months or years ago or that the United States has admitted overflight. Under Annex D it is expected that both reports and photography may be released in toto without the need to conceal the platform. However, tracks indicating the bases used or other operational details will be deleted in accordance with specific instructions in Annex D.

e. Decontrol per Annex E: This will cover situations where it is decided that control of the information will no longer be necessary once an operation has



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


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been secured. Although release of the information may be as complete as under Annex D, the handling instructions will be different because instead of being ex post facto, the possibility of release will have been anticipated, predicated on departure from the operational base. Material procured under this annex will be processed as **SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM** but will be held within the control system until USIB gives the green light for release. (This could have been granted in advance, predicated on completion of an operation.) The same operational facts as those specified for deletion in accordance with Annex D will also be deleted under E. In addition, Annex E must make provision for a limited but rapid dissemination of SitSums covering "pertinent" information and "relevant" supporting photography. The question as to what is "pertinent" and "relevant" will be established by COMOR prior to the beginning of each operation and will be cabled to the processing center. An example of the type of operation envisaged


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
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
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